

Table 1
How important are the following issues to Indonesian foreign policy?

		Mean	SD
I.	Climate Change	3.739	1.043
II.	China's rise and military modernisation.	3.254	1.027
III.	The global financial crisis.	3.961	.728
IV.	The safety of Indonesian migrant workers abroad.	4.231	.861
V.	International Terrorism	4.017	.884

Table 3
Threat Perception of Major Powers & Neighbouring Countries

		Mean	SD	r	95% CI
I.	China.	3.649	1.015	–	-.112 .278
II.	Japan.	2.765	.956	.514***	.414 .602
III.	The United States of America.	3.431	1.133	.485***	.381 .577
IV.	India.	2.858	.953	.351***	.234 .458
V.	Singapore.	3.101	1.048	.323***	.204 .433
VI.	Malaysia.	3.896	.89	.318***	.198 .428
VII.	The European Union.	2.698	.905	.395***	.282 .498
VIII.	South Korea.	2.653	.962	.360***	.244 .466
IX.	Australia.	3.064	.983	.335***	.217 .444
X.	Russia.	2.701	.854	.342***	.224 .45
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001				

Table 4
ASEAN Identity & Indonesian Leadership

		Mean	SD	I.		II.	
				r	95% CI	r	95% CI
I.	ASEAN member states share a common identity.	3.173	1.02	–	–	.173**	.023 .316
II.	Indonesia is the leader of ASEAN.	3.45	1.08	.173**	.023 .316	–	–
III.	The huge cultural differences within Southeast Asia are an obstacle to ASEAN integration.	3.231	1.183	-.247***	-.382 -.101	.095	-.055 .242
IV.	In a reformed United Nations Security Council, Indonesia should be a permanent member to represent ASEAN.	3.7	.996	.236***	.089 .374	.342***	.201 .469
V.	Other ASEAN members perceive Indonesia as leader of the regional grouping.	3.365	.815	.108	-.049 .259	.429***	.291 .548
VI.	The ASEAN Community will not be realized by 2015, because other member states lack dedication.	3.823	.899	-.268***	-.405 -.119	.149*	-.006 .296
VII.	Other ASEAN countries are attractive because Southeast Asians have a lot in common.	3.521	.808	.387***	.249 .509	.133*	-.022 .281
VIII.	The citizens of other ASEAN countries are like brothers and sisters to me.	3.076	1.068	.344***	.204 .470	.171**	.021 .314
IX.	ASEAN should have a joint peacekeeping force to support the United Nations.	3.581	.991	.093	-.058 .239	.003	-.148 .153
X.	In difference to the European Union, ASEAN is an elitist club and the citizens at the grassroots level have little to no impact in it.	3.661	1.068	-.218***	-.359 -.068	.158*	.004 .304
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001						

Table 5
Importance of ASEAN to Regional Order

			I.			II.			III.		
		Mean	SD	r	95% CI	r	95% CI	r	95% CI		
I.	ASEAN member states share a common identity.	3.173	1.02	–	–	-.245***	-.381 -.099	-.287***	-.419 -.141		
II.	Currently ASEAN has still to do a lot to develop a common identity.	4.308	.728	-.245***	-.381 -.099	–	–	.151	-.001 .296		
III.	Citizens of ASEAN do not share a “we-feeling”.	3.53	1.121	-.287***	-.419 -.141	.151	-.001 .296	–	–		
IV.	Great powers dominate the East Asia Summit (EAS), leaving only a managing role to ASEAN.	3.564	.828	-.179*	-.379 -.075	.359***	.213 .489	.206*	.048 .353		
V.	Chinese influence on Cambodia before the first 2012 ASEAN Summit jeopardized ASEAN consensus for the first time in 45 years. In future Chinese influence will split ASEAN apart.	3.436	.932	-.233**	-.379 -.075	.194*	.033 .308	.168*	.005 .321		
VI.	The political and economic influence of the People’s Republic of China will split ASEAN.	3.205	.93	-.092	-.243 .064	.161*	.006 .308	.179*	.024 .327		
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001										

Table 6
Importance of ASEAN to Regional Order

		Mean	SD	I.		II.		III.	
				r	95% CI	r	95% CI	r	95% CI
I.	ASEAN is only a talk-shop.	3.277	1.042	–	–	-.310***	-.442 -.165	.367***	.226 .493
II.	ASEAN is crucial to regional stability and order.	3.659	.834	-.310***	-.442 -.165	–	–	-.141*	-.289 -.013
III.	ASEAN is important, but it will never be as powerful as the European Union.	3.536	1.174	.367***	.226 .493	-.141*	-.289 -.013	–	–
IV.	Chinese influence on Cambodia before the first 2012 ASEAN Summit jeopardized ASEAN consensus for the first time in 45 years. In future Chinese influence will split ASEAN apart.	3.436	.932	.179**	.015 .332	.007	-.156 .169	.176**	.014 .329
V.	The political and economic influence of the People's Republic of China will split ASEAN.	3.205	.93	.202**	.046 .348	-.075	-.229 .082	.221	.067 .365
VI.	China challenges Indonesia's role as a major power and leader in Southeast Asia.	3.63	.818	-.058	-.212 .100	.174**	.018 .322	.065	-.093 .219
VII.	Indonesia is the leader of ASEAN.	3.45	1.08	.127	-.027 .276	.238**	.088 .378	-.048	-.200 .107
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001								

Table 7
Indonesia as leader of ASEAN

		Mean	SD	r	95% CI
I.	Indonesia is the leader of ASEAN.	3.45	1.08	–	–
II.	China is a threat to Indonesia	3.649	1.015	.059	-.094 .208
III.	Chinese influence on Cambodia before the first 2012 ASEAN Summit jeopardized ASEAN consensus for the first time in 45 years. In future Chinese influence will split ASEAN apart.	3.436	.932	.092	-.070 .249
IV.	China challenges Indonesia's role as a major power and leader in Southeast Asia.	3.63	.818	.258***	.107 .397
V.	The political and economic influence of the People's Republic of China will split ASEAN	3.205	.93	-.016	-.172 .141
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 † p=n.s.				

Table 8
China is a threat to Indonesia & Trust in China

				I.		II.	
		Mean	SD	r	95% CI	r	95% CI
I.	China is a threat to Indonesia.	3.649	1.015	–	–	-.272***	-.409 -.124
II.	China's government can be trusted.	2.687	.83	-.272***	-.409 -.124	–	–
III.	Chinese influence on Cambodia before the first 2012 ASEAN Summit jeopardized ASEAN consensus for the first time in 45 years. In future Chinese influence will split ASEAN apart.	3.436	.932	.375***	.227 .506	-.201**	-.352 -.041
IV.	China challenges Indonesia's role as a major power and leader in Southeast Asia.	3.63	.818	.309***	.161 .443	-.022	-.177 .133
V.	The political and economic influence of the People's Republic of China will split ASEAN.	3.205	.93	.340***	.194 .471	-.283***	-.419 -.133
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 † p=n.s.						

Table 9
Indonesia's foreign policy makes to many compromises and is not assertive enough.

		Mean	SD	r	95% CI
I.	Indonesian foreign policy makes to many compromises. Indonesia should act more assertive and confident to protect its national interests.	4.383	.809	–	–
II.	China is a threat to Indonesia	3.649	1.015	.131*	.020 .277
III.	China's military modernisation is a threat to Indonesia's security.	3.071	.988	.129*	.024 .275
IV.	Chinese influence on Cambodia before the first 2012 ASEAN Summit jeopardised ASEAN consensus for the first time in 45 years. In future Chinese influence will split ASEAN apart.	3.436	.932	.083	-.080 .241
V.	China challenges Indonesia's role as a major power and leader in Southeast Asia.	3.63	.818	.205**	.052 .349
VI.	China's increasing economic influence and strategic investments into core industries and resources exploitation are more a threat than an opportunity to Indonesia's economy.	3.756	.912	.105	-.049 .253
VII.	The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is a threat to Indonesia's economy.	3.466	1.037	.239***	.087 .381
VIII.	The political and economic influence of the People's Republic of China will split ASEAN.	3.205	.93	.073	-.084 .226
IX.	China's naval build-up, for example its new aircraft carrier, will trigger an arms race in the region.	3.425	.968	.237***	.084 .379
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001				

Table 10
Bebas-Aktif, ASEAN Identity & Leadership

	Mean	SD	I. r	95% CI	II. r	95% CI
I. ASEAN member states share a common identity.	3.173	1.02	–	–	.173**	.023 .316
II. Indonesia is the leader of ASEAN	3.45	1.08	.173**	.023 .316	–	–
III. Indonesia focuses too strongly on its regional role. Instead it should focus on its global role.	3.22	1.08	.074	-.077 .222	.018	-.134 .169
IV. “Rowing between two reefs” is the right policy to deal with great power competition in the region.	3.548	.978	-.038	-.194 .119	.149*	.008 .300
V. Indonesian foreign policy makes to many compromises. Indonesia should act more assertive and confident to protect its national interests.	4.383	.809	.058	-.093 .207	-.045	-.195 .108
VI. The membership in the G20 indicates that Indonesia should focus more on becoming a global power.	3.83	.945	.078	-.074 .226	.207**	.057 .348
VII. The concept of the “concentric circles” is crucial to Indonesian foreign policy.	3.474	.758	-.129*	-.293 -.043	.147*	-.025 .311

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 † p=n.s.

Table 11

Perception of a Chinese threat to Indonesia, demand for a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy and challenge to traditional foreign policy concepts

		Mean	SD	I.			II.			III.		
				r	95% CI		r	95% CI		r	95% CI	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
I.	The rise of China is a challenge to Indonesia's rise	3.153	.970	–	–	.268***	.145 .383	.283***	.161 .396			
II.	China's rise and military modernisation are a threat to Indonesia	3.254	1.027	.268***	.145 .383	–	–	.067	–	.067	–	–
III.	China is a threat.	3.649	1.015	.283***	.161 .396	.067	–	–	–	–	–	–
IV.	ASEAN member states share a common identity.	3.173	1.02	.041	–	.019	–	–	–	–	–	–
V.	Indonesia is the leader of ASEAN	3.45	1.08	.148	–	.067	–	–	–	–	–	–
VI.	Indonesia focuses too strongly on its regional role. Instead it should focus on its global role.	3.22	1.08	.065	–	.067	–	–	–	–	–	–
VII.	"Rowing between two reefs" is the right policy to deal with great power competition in the region.	3.548	.978	–	–	.014	–	–	–	–	–	–
VIII.	Indonesian foreign policy makes to many compromises, Indonesia should act more assertive and confident to protect its national interests.	4.383	809	.175**	.011 .330	.182**	.034 .322	.131*	.020 .277			
IX.	The membership in the G20 indicates that Indonesia should focus more on becoming a global power.	3.83	.945	.012	–	.013	–	.176*	.025 .319			

Table 11 (cont.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
X.	The concept of the “concentric circles” is crucial to Indonesian foreign policy.	3.474	.758	.120	-.075 .307	.072	-.102 .241	.110	-.062 .276
XI.	Indonesia’s foreign policy is messy, chaotic and too often lacks clear goals.	3.67	1.098	.025	-.141 .189	.079	-.071 .225	.065	-.087 .214
XII.	Indonesian foreign policy is far-sighted and takes domestic as well as international and geopolitical factors into account.	3.131	.946	.050	-.124 .221	-.147	-.310 .026	.059	-.115 .231
XIII.	The idea of “bebas-aktif” is still very important in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy.	3.65	.966	.064	-.102 .226	-.069	-.218 .081	-.006	-.157 .145
XIV.	“Bebas-aktif” is an archaic idea that does not fit to address the challenges of the 21st century.	2.745	1.034	.019	-.153 .189	.217**	.063 .361	.128	-.027 .277
XV.	“A million friends, zero enemies” is an utopian idea. It does not help to secure Indonesia’s national interests.	3.89	1.064	.058	-.109 .223	.008	-.145 .161	.083	-.068 .231
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001								

Table 12

Perception of a Chinese threat to ASEAN, demand for a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy and challenge to traditional foreign policy concepts

				I.			II.			III.		
		Mean	SD	r	95% CI	r	95% CI	r	95% CI	r	95% CI	
I	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
I.	Chinese influence on Cambodia before the first 2012 ASEAN Summit jeopardized ASEAN consensus for the first time in 45 years. In future Chinese influence will split ASEAN apart.	3.436	.932	–	–	.596***	.479 .691	.229**	.069 .377			
II.	The political and economic influence of the People's Republic of China will split ASEAN.	3.205	.93	.596***	.479 .691	–	–	.222**	.068 .366			
III.	China challenges Indonesia's role as a major power and leader in Southeast Asia.	3.63	.818	.229**	.069 .377	.222**	.068 .366	–	–			
IV.	ASEAN member states share a common identity.	3.173	1.02	-.016	-.181 .151	-.100	-.255 .059	.150	-.004 .298			
V.	Indonesia is the leader of ASEAN	3.45	1.08	.028	-.139 .194	.085	-.075 .242	.258***	.107 .397			
VI.	Indonesia focuses too strongly on its regional role. Instead it should focus on its global role.	3.22	1.08	-.051	-.211 .112	-.090	-.243 .067	.046	-.110 .200			
VII.	"Rowing between two reefs" is the right policy to deal with great power competition in the region.	3.548	.978	.049	-.117 .213	-.054	-.214 .109	-.006	-.167 .156			
VIII.	Indonesian foreign policy makes too many compromises. Indonesia should act more assertive and confident to protect its national interests.	4.383	809	.083	-.080 .241	.073	-.084 .226	.205**	.052 .349			

Table 12 (cont.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
IX.	The membership in the G20 indicates that Indonesia should focus more on becoming a global power.	3.83	.945	.101	-.062 .258	.233**	.079 .376	.120	-.035 .270
XI.	The concept of the “concentric circles” is crucial to Indonesian foreign policy.	3.474	.758	.178*	.001 .343	.188*	.015 .349	-.073	-.242 .102
XII.	Indonesia’s foreign policy is messy, chaotic and too often lacks clear goals.	3.67	1.098	.117	-.045 .273	.108	-.049 .259	-.108	-.259 .049
XIII.	Indonesian foreign policy is far-sighted and takes domestic as well as international and geopolitical factors into account.	3.131	.946	-.024	-.206 .160	.128	-.052 .301	.288**	.115 .443
XIV.	The idea of “bebas-aktif” is still very important in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy.	3.65	.966	.111	-.052 .267	-.099	-.249 .057	.029	-.127 .182
XV.	“Bebas-aktif” is an archaic idea that does not fit to address the challenges of the 21st century.	2.745	1.034	.195*	.034 .347	.346***	.199 .479	.112	-.047 .265
XVI.	“A million friends, zero enemies” is an utopian idea. It does not help to secure Indonesia’s national interests.	3.89	1.064	.174*	.013 .326	.190*	.036 .326	.036	-.119 .189
	*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001								